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Efficient and reliable public transport is of prime concern to city dwellers. To 
function efficiently, public transport generally needs subsidies from the state or 
local government. Our goal was to design and develop an alternative model of 
property tax that would provide financing for public transport. It was hypothesised 
that if the market value of real estate depends on the proximity of public transport, 
property tax can be a reliable source of financing for public transport. Based on 
the hedonic pricing theory, we used multiple regression to measure the impact of 
public transport proximity on the value of residential property. The data on the 
market value of property and property tax was taken from statistical tax reporting 
forms of the Federal Tax Service. The data on various public transport infrastructure 
facilities was used from the specialized open registers. We tested our alternative 
model of property tax, using the case of the Ekaterinburg Metro and the Tram and 
Trolleybus Company, through regression analysis of 7,685 objects of residential 
property in the City of Ekaterinburg. It was found that the efficiency of the 
underground service is higher than that of the city’s tram network. On the average, 
the proximity of underground stations increases the value of housing by over 6%. 
As predictive estimation of the amount of tax determined by the proximity of 
public transport showed, the alternative model of property tax is sufficient to cover 
capital expenditures of the city’s public transport operators and could, therefore, 
contribute to further expansion and modernization of the transport network.
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Налог на недвижимость физических лиц 
как источник финансирования общественного транспорта
Е.В. Леонтьев  , Ю.В. Леонтьева 




Эффективный и надежный общественный транспорт представляет первооче-
редной интерес в жизни городских жителей. Для эффективного функциониро-
вания общественному транспорту как правило требуются субсидии от государ-
ства или органов местного самоуправления. Намерение состояло в том, чтобы 
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спроектировать и разработать альтернативную модель налога на имущество, 
которая обеспечила бы источник финансирования для общественного транс-
порта. Гипотеза исследования основана на предположении, что, если рыночная 
стоимость недвижимости зависит от близости остановок общественного транс-
порта, то налог на имущество может стать надежным источником финансиро-
вания общественного транспорта. Основываясь на теории гедонистического 
ценообразования, мы использовали множественную регрессию для измерения 
влияния близости общественного транспорта на стоимость жилой недвижимо-
сти. Источником информации о рыночной стоимости имущества и налоге на 
имущество являлись формы статистической налоговой отчетности Федераль-
ной налоговой службы. Для получения информации о различных объектах ин-
фраструктуры общественного транспорта использовались открытые данные из 
специализированных регистров. Предложенная альтернативная модель налога 
на имущество была протестирована на примере Екатеринбургского метропо-
литена и Трамвайно-троллейбусной компании путем регрессионного анализа 
7 685 объектов жилой недвижимости в городе Екатеринбурге. Сделан вывод, 
что эффективность метро выше, чем у городской трамвайной сети. Близость 
станций метро в среднем увеличивает стоимость жилья более чем на 6%. Про-
гнозная оценка суммы налога, зависящей от близости общественного транспор-
та, показала, что альтернативная модель налога на имущество достаточна для 
покрытия капитальных затрат операторов общественного транспорта города и, 
следовательно, может способствовать дальнейшему расширению и модерниза-
ции транспортной сети.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
модель налога на недвижимость, общественный транспорт, налог на имуще-
ство, стоимость недвижимости, метрополитен, трамвай
1. Introduction
An extensive, developed and easily 
accessible transport network is commonly 
seen as a major public good. Fiscal tools 
have traditionally been used by govern-
ments to finance public transport. The 
conceptual and methodological principles 
underpinning the application of these 
tools were described in numerous taxa-
tion theories. 
An efficient and reliable municipal 
transport system stands high on the list 
of priorities of any city council. To handle 
this task, it is necessary to search for the 
ways of financing the transport network’s 
operation and its expansion. Funding al-
ternatives include, first and foremost, the 
fares charged for carrying passengers. In 
this case, the revenue comes from the di-
rect users of the transport services. In the 
majority of cases, however, in addition to 
revenues from fares, to function efficient-
ly, public transport also needs subsidies 
from the state and local government.
State subsidies to public transport are 
necessary if the revenue from fares does 
not cover the operating expenses. In this 
case, a question arises as to what can be an 
alternative source of funds to close this gap. 
Even though there is a variety of mod-
els for financing the maintenance needs of 
transport infrastructure as well as the con-
struction of a new one, in Russia most of 
these innovative funding techniques have 
found no practical application so far.
The aim of this research is to propose 
a new model of property tax that would 
provide a reliable source of financing for 
municipal transport. 
To this end, we are going to address 
the following objectives: 
1) prove that the individual property 
tax can serve as a possible source of co-
funding for public transport; 
2) describe a mechanism for identi- 
fying the portion of the tax generated by 
the vicinity of a developed public trans-
port system; 
3) test the possibility of using this tax 
as a source of financing of operational 
and/or capital expenses of public trans-
port operators.
Our hypothesis is that it is possible to 
build a property tax model that would se-
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cure a reliable source of financing of public 
transport depending on the impact that the 
vicinity of municipal public transport has 
on the market value of real estate property.
2. Literature review
2.1. Taxes as a tool for estimation 
of the cost of public services 
One of the fundamental taxation theo-
ries is the theory of exchange, which is 
conceptually based on the benefit princi-
ple and emphasizes the contractual nature 
of public services. 
The exchange theory also had a 
major impact on the studies of public fi-
nance as well as decision-making in con-
cerning public expenditures and revenue 
policies. De Viti de Marco [1], Wicksell [2], 
Lindahl [3], and later Mazzola [4] adopted 
the methodology of the marginalist theory 
of value to study public spending. These 
studies consider the state as a group of 
persons paying taxes in exchange for ser-
vices (public goods), which the ultimate 
consumers can take advantage of. The ap-
proaches to taxation as payment for pub-
lic services underpinning the voluntary 
exchange theory are widely applied in 
contemporary studies on various kinds of 
public services and goods.
Enoch et al. [5] use as a point of de-
parture the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, 
meaning that it is the beneficiary or the 
user of public goods who pays for them. 
This explains the practice of using taxes 
and charges for public transport financing, 
e.g. the imposition of local charges on the 
inhabitants of specific areas and other tax-
payer groups (e.g. employers) that would 
benefit from the access to public transport.
Keid [6] demonstrates that the cost-ef-
fectiveness of public transport as a public 
good, which can be replaced by commer-
cial alternatives, can be measured through 
the quality to cost ratio, the latter taking 
the form of taxes spent on financing these 
goods. The assessment of cost-effective-
ness normally encompasses the tax bur-
den levels borne by groups of households 
depending on their income. 
In practice, the principle ‘beneficiary 
pays’ may be difficult to realize since this 
approach is based on the estimation of the 
fairness and efficiency of the calculations 
of the tax-burden-to-income ratio, which 
makes it hard to compare the actual taxes 
paid with the value of the public goods 
one can benefit from [7].
Governments tax citizens not only to 
produce pure public goods but also to pro-
duce and distribute specific commodities. 
Aaron & McGuire [8] argue that it is dif-
ficult to break down the tax revenue from 
each household into distinct components, 
one of which is spent on public goods and 
the rest go to other purposes. 
Access to certain types of public goods 
(including transport services) directly de-
pends on the location of the taxpayer’s 
household. This allows us to consider spe-
cific taxes as a fair price for the access to 
such public good (see Van den Branden et 
al. [9], Ubbels [10]).
The amount of public goods and 
sources of their financing are discussed at 
length in the works of Anthony B. Atkin-
son, who proposed a formula of the opti-
mal balance of public production [11]. 
Atkinson also compares the optimal 
level of public goods provision in rela-
tion to distorting and non-distorting 
taxation. He demonstrates the possibi-
lity of achieving a higher level of public 
goods provision while using lump-sum 
(non-distorting) taxation [11].
Thus, there is considerable research 
evidence that financing of public goods 
involving the use of the least distorting 
taxes is an effective instrument for main-
taining the optimal level of public goods 
provision.
2.2. Taxpayer funds as a source 
of public transport financing 
Private vehicles are among the 
major causes of traffic congestion and 
air pollution in cities. The main theoreti-
cal premise behind transport taxation is 
the need to reduce private car usage and 
to curb its negative effects [12; 13]. Such 
regulations may rely on fiscal tools of 
different kinds. Some countries use toll 
charges to regulate the traffic on cen-
tral streets with public transport being 
exempt from tolls. 
Journal of Tax Reform. 2021;7(1):6–19
9
ISSN 2412-8872
Farrell [14] investigated the system of 
taxes and charges in Scandinavian coun-
tries for financing the development of the 
road network and municipal transport. 
She also mentions the Golden Gate Bridge 
toll in San Fransisco (USA), which also has 
a targeted character and is spent on the 
Bridge‘s maintenance and related public 
transit services [14]. These funds are then 
used to finance bus lines and ferry services. 
Another variation of the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle is the model where a funding 
source for public transport is provided by 
consumption taxes. Taxes embedded in the 
price of commodities polluting the environ-
ment help regulate their consumption and 
engender extra revenue. Buehler & Pucher 
[15] analyzed and proved the efficiency of 
this approach in various countries. 
In this case what matters is not only 
the direct financing for public transport 
from tax revenues but also an increase 
in ridership and in ticket sales. Austin & 
Dinan [16] associate this effect with the 
changes in consumer preferences found 
in completely different city types. Tani-
shita et al. [17] point to the much higher 
level of efficiency in this type of taxation 
in comparison with the taxation of private 
vehicle owners.
Tax revenues from polluters may be 
raised not only through fuel taxes but also 
through taxes on car ownership [18]. In this 
case, there may be two possible influences 
on public transport: greater reliance on 
more environmentally friendly collective 
means of transportation and generation 
of extra funds for the development of the 
public transport and road network. Sand-
mo [18] described the conceptual frame-
work for a large number of models focused 
on the replacement of private vehicles by 
public transport.
A fundamentally different approach 
to public transport financing is by taxing 
beneficiaries. White’s [19] concept is a 
form of ‘collective purchase’ of services 
followed by benefiting from them. There 
are two distinct types of beneficiaries: em-
ployers and property owners. An example 
of such taxes raised on employers for 
transport purposes is the French versement 
tax levied on the total gross salaries. Ub-
bels & Nijkamp [20] in their study of taxa-
tion on property owners highlighted that 
such taxes may include an addition to the 
tax base generated through the adjacency 
to public transport. 
Thus, the models of taxation of public 
transport users can be divided into three 
groups:
1. Financing public transport from 
the common funding ‘pot’ (the so-called 
‘all-in-one-pot’ principle), replenished 
from tax receipts. This form of finan-
cing is the most common. It is based on 
the following conventional mechanism: 
money is allocated from the budget 
formed through ‘general’ taxation. In 
this model, the government raises reve- 
nue from different taxable sources and 
public transport has to compete for funds 
with other public services such as health 
care and education. Transport is often not 
among the top priorities of public spen-
ding. Moreover, the amount of tax in this 
case is unrelated to the taxpayer’s use of 
this service.
2. The ‘polluter pays’ principle means 
that the revenues from taxes on pri-
vate vehicle use and ownership are ear-
marked to specific spending purposes. 
These funds may be spent not only on 
pollution prevention and control but also 
on the development of public transport, 
which has a lower environmental impact.
3. The ‘beneficiary pays’ principle 
means that public transport is financed by 
taxing direct beneficiaries, that is, those 
enjoying direct or hidden benefits from 
the use of public transport.
Our literature review has shown that 
in global practices of public transport fi-
nancing, these instruments may be em-
ployed differently and are based on dif-
ferent mechanisms of co-funding.
2.3. Modern approaches 
to financing public transit 
In some cases public transport is fi-
nanced from the special fund replenished 
through special taxes and charges ear-
marked for this purpose. Vigrass & Smith 
[21] described this model by using the 
case of the versement transport tax (VT) in 
France, which is a tax levied on the total 
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gross salaries of all employees of com-
panies of more than 11 employees. It is a 
local tax earmarked specifically for finan-
cing transit. The general VT rate is 11.5%. 
The VT is a powerful tool that covers 
about 39% of the costs of public transport 
in France [21]. The amount of this tax does 
not depend on the consumption of trans-
port services but is a payment for the pos-
sibility to use the transport network.
Owen et al. [22] discuss this approach 
by looking at the case of the transport pro-
gram in Los Angeles (USA), which was 
funded through a half-cent (0.5%) sales 
tax. What is interesting about this pro-
gram, which includes plans for develop-
ment of bus routes and rail transport, is 
that the funds are raised through indirect 
taxation. 
Pucher [23] argues that another viable 
approach is to tax car owners since private 
vehicles have a much greater negative im-
pact on the environment. Such approach 
can be illustrated, for example, by the gas 
tax in the Provinces of Quebec and On-
tario, a portion of which is transferred to 
finance public transit. This portion is ex-
pressed in kind and is added to the cost of 
every litre of gasoline. Apart from the ap-
parent simplicity of this approach, it also 
discourages environmental pollution. 
Jalon et al. [24], however, point out 
that the main drawback of this kind of 
financing resides in the lack of clear con-
nection between the expenditures of pub-
lic transport companies and the effects re-
sulting from their operation.
Dye & Merriman [25] reveal the po-
tential of the mechanism called Tax In-
crement Financing (TIF). TIF is a model 
of financing infrastructure development 
projects based on the expectation of the 
tax revenue growth resulting from the 
improvements of the area in question. 
An infrastructural project is expected to 
increase the cost of the property and/or 
land of the neighbouring areas and also 
increase the tax revenue, thus allowing 
the authorities to avoid raising the tax 
rate. All such tax increments or only their 
part, including the revenue from the in-
frastructural project itself, are redistribu-
ted in favour of the TIF-project’s operator 
until the end of the project and are used 
to cover the initial investment into the 
project.
Man & Rosentraub [26] studied the 
outcomes of a TIF program and found that 
there was an increase in the revenue from 
the sales tax and an increase in the number 
of jobs. The conclusion they make is that 
the TIF program had a positive effect on 
urban economy. 
Some authors are less appreciative 
of the benefits of this tool. According to 
Clark & O’Connor [27], TIF is based on the 
investment that implies an increase in the 
value of property, which in the conditions 
of an ‘opaque’ financial market can lead to 
dubious consequences. Housing bubbles 
can result in a collapse in property prices, 
which, in its turn, will make the develo-
per’s unable to return the investment. 
Weber [28], on the contrary, shows 
that the application of the TIF tools du-
ring the real estate bubble crisis in the US 
allowed some of the municipalities that 
implemented infrastructural projects to 
avoid the harmful effects of the crisis. For 
instance, the crisis in 2007 had no effect on 
such projects in Chicago and other Ameri-
can cities.
Smolka & Furtado [29] demonstrated 
that large public transport stations pro-
vide ample opportunities for the deve-
lopment of commerce and commercial 
property. Such projects in Brazil, namely 
in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, were 
quite successful primarily thanks to the 
modernization and clustering of residen-
tial property areas along the lines of pub-
lic transport. In Curitibe, however, a simi-
lar project was not successful due to land 
speculation and the displacement of the 
poor to the suburbs.
Cocconcelli & Medda [30] showed 
that in order to prevent the appearance of 
speculative bubbles in the real estate mar-
ket, it is necessary to conduct property 
value assessment in due time and regulate 
the property tax rate in case of sharp fluc-
tuations of the tax base.
Bourassa [31] uses the case of Pitts-
burgh to illustrate that an increase in the 
rates of land value taxes can cause sig-
nificant resentment on the part of the tax- 
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payers and that the failure to generate 
good PR of an infrastructural project may 
also lead to the project’s closure. 
Our literature review has shown that 
the most widely spread approaches are 
those based on state financing of public 
transport. The TIF model appears to be 
practically applicable since it is based on 
a rather simple calculation mechanism 
and establishes the connection between 
the efficiency of public transport and its 
financing.
3. Methodology
Table 1 shows the key stages in our 
research and the corresponding methods. 
Table 1
Key stages of the methodology
№ Stage Description
1. Identification of 
the beneficiaries
By applying the 
hedonic pricing model 
we determined the 
impact of public 
transport on the cost 
of property
2. Identification of 
the property tax 
base generated by 
public transport
Calculation of the 
share of the tax base 
generated by public 
transport 




the property tax 
base generated by 
residential property 
alone
4. Calculation of 
the amount of 
the property tax 
generated by 
public transport
Calculation of the 
portion of the property 
tax generated by the 






payment to the 
public transport 
operator
Estimation of the 
operator’s actual 
expenditures and the 
comparison of this 
figure with the amount 
of the bonus payment
 
The most widely used methodology 
for measuring the impact of a certain at-
tribute on the general cost of a property is 
based on the hedonic theory. The hedonic 
pricing model is a standard econometric in-
strument for evaluation of determinant at-
tributes of various goods, in particular resi-
dential property [32]. The hedonic model 
for calculating the value of property [33] 
determined by the proximity of transport 
infrastructure confirms the supposition 
that there is indeed a dependency between 
the value of property and public transport 
accessibility [34]. This model can also be 
used to estimate this dependency for taxa-
tion purposes [35].
The elements of our model for calcu-
lating the amount of the tax to be trans-
ferred to public transport operators as an 
efficiency bonus are as follows:
1. Sources of all the necessary data;
2. Methodology for data processing;
3. The frequency of iterations for calcu-
lating the base cost of a square metre and 
the coefficient of transport accessibility;
4. Methodology of calculating the 
share of the property tax to be transferred 
to a public transport operator;
5. Government agency responsible for 
the implementation of this mechanism
In our choice of data sources we fol-
lowed the principle of transparency, 
which is the key principle used for mass 
appraisal of real property for taxation 
purposes. To estimate the impact of pub-
lic transport on the value of property, we 
chose open sources of data over speciali-
zed registers with restricted access. Thus, 
we were able to justify the need to transfer 
tax receipts to public transport operators.
In our calculations of the model, we 
relied on the following data types:
● Information about the market value 
of property;
● Information about the amount of 
property tax accrued;
● Information about different objects 
of the public transport infrastructure
All of the above-mentioned types of 
data are publicly available. The Federal 
Tax Service publishes the accrued prop-
erty tax data on their official web-site on 
an annual basis. 
Objects of the public transport in-
frastructure are used in the model in the 
form of data on geographic coordinates 
of transport stops. Such coordinates were 
obtained from online map services, in-
cluding free ones. 
The information about the market 
value of property as well as the charac-
teristics of these objects can also be ob-
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tained from various sources such as the 
publicly available online information 
about the cost of property for sale and 
specialized property registers. The latter 
include the information about purchase 
and sale property transactions registered 
in the Federal Service for State Registra-
tion, Cadastre and Cartography (Ros-
reestr). Rosreest provides more accurate 
data since they take into account all the 
discounts made by sellers and included 
in the original cost of the property as 
shown in real estate ads. Eventually we 
chose publicly available information 
sources to increase the transparency of 
our analysis.
To measure the impact of transport 
infrastructure proximity on the cost of 
a residential property, it is better to use 
multiple regression, which is the most 
widely used method for measuring 
the impact of a certain attribute on the 
object’s total cost based on the hedonic 
pricing theory. According to this theo-
ry, the property can be considered as 
a commodity whose price depends on 
the group of cumulative characteristics. 
These include not only inherent qualities 
of the property but also the overall am-
bience of the location and accessibility of 
certain infrastructure objects.
The next question to be considered is 
the choice of a model calculation method 
for the whole individual property tax base. 
The most suitable method, in our view, is 
to calculate the share for each individual 
property and then extrapolate the results 
of the model proportionally to the whole 
tax base.
The tax base for the individual pro-
perty tax comprises not only the value of 
residential but also non-residential pro-
perty such as garages, parking space, etc. 
We can calculate the share of the tax re-
venue to be transferred to a public trans-
port operator as an efficiency bonus in a 
computational model (using the real es-
tate data) and the adjustment coefficient 
will be applied to calculate the share of the 
tax base corresponding to residential pro-
perty. The information on the distribution 
of the tax base by property type can be ob-
tained from statistical tax reporting forms 
5-MN published on the official website of 
the Federal Tax Service. 
In our study, we are going to rely on 
the aggregate statistical data from open 
official sources. The resulting model was 
estimated by using individual property 
tax revenue in Ekaterinburg. 
4. Results
4.1. Analysis of public transportation 
funding models 
There are three general models of 
public transport financing:
1. Reimbursement of the public 
transport operator’s actual expenditures. 
In this scheme, the operator‘s expendi-
tures are covered from the public budget 
formed through general taxation reve-
nues. The amount of transfers to the ope-
rator depends on the operator’s general 
operational expenses. Since the amount of 
the necessary funds will vary in different 
years and due to the lack of the tax base 
that could be assigned to the sum of the 
operator’s expenses, the most widely used 
approach is the so-called ‘all in one pot’ 
method. Since in this model all sources 
of tax revenue are used, we can conclude 
that the costs of public transport are co-
vered by all the taxpayers, regardless of 
whether they actually benefit from these 
services or not.
2. Reimbursement of the public trans-
port operator’s expenditures through the 
costs paid by owners or users of private 
vehicles since cars are the biggest contrib-
utors to air pollution in urban areas and 
other issues such as congestions, road ac-
cidents, etc. This principle is underpinned 
by the idea that public transport provides 
a ‘healthier’ alternative to private vehicles. 
Collective use of public transport reduces 
these negative effects and is, therefore, 
seen as a more sustainable and preferable 
alternative. In this model, transport taxes 
and fuel levies play a crucial role: the reve-
nue coming from these sources is directed 
to fund the public transport network.
3. The bonus payment to the develo-
per building a certain object of transport 
infrastructure comes from the tax revenue 
generated through the positive externali-
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ties from this developer’s work. What dis-
tinguishes this model is that the amount of 
financing depends on the positive effect of 
the operator’s activities rather than on the 
operator’s expenditures. This model may 
rely on general tax revenue as well as on 
specific taxes or on beneficiaries (Table 2).
All of the above-described models are 
by no means the optimal solution to this 
problem. What they have in common is 
that they all deal with the ways of reim-
bursing the expenses of public transport 
operators or developers engaged in con-
struction of transport infrastructure. It 
should also be noted that these models do 
not take into account the efficiency of pub-
lic transport operations and its utility for 
individual taxpayers. 
In our view, the optimal model would 
be to use a part of the individual property 
tax for this purpose. The tax base for this 
tax is the value of property, which, in its 
turn, is partially affected by the accessi-
bility and efficiency of the public trans-
port network. It is this increase in the tax 
revenue that could serve as a source of 
financing for municipal transport and its 
modernization. 
The main idea behind the proposed 
model is to estimate the possibility of 
identifying the amount of the property 
tax revenue generated through the de-
velopment of the transport network in a 
given area and to test the sufficiency of 
this sum for financing transport operation 
and modernization depending on the ef-
ficiency of the operators. 
4.2. Financing of public goods through 
distorting and non-distorting taxes
To demonstrate the role that taxation 
plays in public transport financing, we 
intend to use the formula reflecting the 
consumption of goods by the whole com-
munity. This formula was derived from 
Atkinson’s equation [11]:
pHX + (pgGloc + pgGgov) = HL,        (1)
where HL is the consumption of goods in 
the community (L is the individual level 
of consumption); p is the cost of a private 
good; HX is the consumption of a private 
good by the community (X is the indi-
vidual level of consumption of a private 
good); Gloc and Ggov are the possibilities of 
production of public goods by local au-
thorities and the national government re-
spectively; pg is the cost of production of 
public goods by local authorities and the 
national government. 
Since public transport is one of the lo-
cal public goods, it would make sense to 
present the production of public goods 
as a sum of production of different goods 
that qualify as local. To analyze ways of 
transport financing, we are going to con-
sider the production of local public goods 
as a sum of public transportation services 
(denoted as pgGtran) and other local public 
goods (denoted as pgGloc.other): 
pHX + (pgGgov + (pgGloc.other + pgGtran) = HL. (2) 
This formula can be used to compare 
the results of financing of public goods 
production in different models.
Table 2
Relationship between the sources of public funding and mechanism 
of reimbursement for municipal transport operators
Reimburse-




Reimbursement of the 
operator’s expenditures is 
provided from the funds 
collected from the owners 
of private vehicles, 
which have a negative 
environmental impact
Bonus payment to the 
developer building a 
certain object of transport 
infrastructure comes from 
the tax revenue generated 
through positive externalities 
from this developer’s work 
Reimbursement from 
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Let us now consider the alternative 
way of financing through the distorting 
tax charged on the consumption of private 
goods. To this end, we will present p as 
a sum (p + t), where t is the tax rate:
(p + t)HX +  (3)
+ (pgGgov + (pgGloc.other + pgGtran)) = HL.
In the situation where all the taxes 
raised are spent to produce public goods, 
the sum of the tax (denoted as T) will be 
equal to the sum of all the public goods. 
The formula will look the following way:
(p + t)X + Т = L. (4)
To achieve the optimal public wel-
fare, it is necessary to maximize individ-
ual utility (Ux):
Ux = a(p + t), (5)
where a is the marginal individual utility 
equal to UL.
An increase in public utility is 
achieved through maximization of the 
sum of individual utilities (HU) and can 
be expressed through the Lagrangian in 
the following way:
 = HU(X, L, G) – λ(pH + pGG – HL).  (6)
Extrema of this expression are equal 
to zero of the derivative function shown 
above.
∂ ∂ ∂ = − λ + − =  ∂ ∂ ∂
 0.G G
X LHU pH p H
G G G  
(7)
After transforming the resulting equa-
tion, we obtain the following:
∂ = −λ   ∂
.G G
HU Xp tH
a a G  
(8)
The main conclusion that can be made 
by looking at the right side of the given 
equation is that an increase in the level of 
public goods significantly limits the possi-
bility of increasing the revenues from dis-
torting taxes used to finance such goods. 
Returning to formula (3), let us con-
sider the impact of a non-distorting tax 
on the balance of the public goods pro-
duction. In this case, the tax will be in the 
right-hand side of the equation, which 
will look the following way:
pHX + (pgGgov + (pgGloc.other + pgGtran)) =
= HL + T. 
(9)
The above formula illustrates the neu-
trality of non-distorting taxation in rela-
tion to private goods consumption.
A significant characteristic of local 
public goods is that the range of poten-
tial users is spatially limited. Therefore, 
a community (a city district or a city) can 
be considered as a single location with 
a more or less homogeneous public trans-
port infrastructure. The access to public 
transport is thus enjoyed primarily by 
those who inhabit this territory (e.g. own 
a property located in this area). Although 
formally public transport can be used by 
non-locals, members of other communi-
ties, in practice this does not happen very 
often due to the distance factor.
Thus, we believe that, making a cer-
tain assumption, property taxes are the 
taxes with the minimal level of distortion 
in what regards public transport. There-
fore, property taxes hold much promise 
for financing public transport. 
This way of financing, however, does 
not exclude other mechanisms of funding 
local public goods such as transport.
4.3. The model was tested by using  
the case of Ekaterinburg (Russia)
To provide financing for urban trans-
port operators through the mechanism 
described above, we need to calculate the 
share of the tax corresponding to the im-
pact of the transport infrastructure on the 
value of residential property.
Since the fiscal period of the property 
tax is 1 year, it would be reasonable to es-
timate the impact of public transport on 
the value of residential property no more 
frequently than once a year.
Municipal public transport is con-
trolled by local authorities, which is why 
it would make sense that local authorities 
should be made responsible for calculat-
ing the amount of bonus payments to the 
public transport operators.
For our study we chose two operators 
of public transport in Ekaterinburg: Ekate-
rinburg Metro (Ekaterinburgskiy metropo-
liten) and the tram and trolley-bus com-
pany (Tramvayno-trolleybusnoye upravlenie). 
Ekaterinburg is a large Russian city with 
a developed public transport network com-
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prising almost all modes of public trans-
port. The city’s population size is about 
1.5 million and the city ranks high in Russia 
in terms of the number of private vehicles 
The volume of passenger traffic of the city’s 
public transport is over 400 million people 
a year. Lately, however, the passenger flow 
has been steadily decreasing, which can be 
explained by the low quality of transport 
services and the insufficient efficiency of 
public transport operations. The shrinking 
passenger flow creates a scarcity of funds 
of the public transport company for further 
development of the network.
The above-described mechanism for 
calculating bonus payments is shown in 
Figure 1.
This mechanism is based on estimat-
ing the impact of the proximity of the pub-
lic transport infrastructure on the market 
value of residential property and it re-
quires no complex calculations or compu-
tational tools, which is why no extra jobs 
or new software will be necessary for its 
implementation. 
In our previous studies [36], we calcu-
lated the median values of the impact that 
the transport infrastructure proximity has 
on the cost of real estate property in Ekat-
erinburg. The closer is the property to the 
transportation network, the more benefits 
are enjoyed by the owner of this property. 
Moreover, the more efficient is the public 
transport, the more significant is the influ-
ence of its proximity on the value of the 
property. In our view, the latter may serve 
as an indirect indicator of the public trans-
port operator’s efficiency or inefficiency. 
The calculated values of the impact of 
public transport proximity on the cost of 
property are shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Impact of public transport stops 









stations 3.00 12.00 6.09
Tram 
stops 3.20 8.80 5.47
These figures were obtained through 
regression analysis of 7,685 objects of resi-
dential property in Ekaterinburg. It can be 
concluded that the efficiency of the under-
ground service is higher than that of the 
city’s tram network. The proximity of un-
derground stations on average increases 
the cost of housing by more than 6%.
We used the data gathered through 
our previous research to determine the 
projected values of transfers to the tram 
and trolley-bus company and Metro. To 
take into account the fact that the indi-
vidual property tax is imposed not only 
on residential but also on non-residential 








Data processing in the 
GIS  system followed by 
an  econometric analysis
Publishing of the calculated  
coefficient and amount of 




Transfer of funds to the 
transport operator
Publishing the relevant 
information in open 
access sources
Gathering data from 
5-MN reporting forms
Calculation of the 
amount of the tax 
revenue to be transferred 
to the operator
Gathering data on the 
residential property for 
sale on the market
Information about the 
coordinates of transport 
stations and stops
Fig. 1. Mechanism for calculating bonus payments to public transport operators
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coefficient, which corresponds to the 
share of the tax base on residential prop-
erty of the general property tax base. For 
Ekaterinburg, this coefficient is 0.76696.
According to the 2019 budget report, 
the total amount of the tax revenue was 
1,337,546 thousand roubles. The sum re-
sulting from the adjustment for the coeffi-
cient was 1,025,844 thousand roubles. We 
used the median values of the impact that 
the proximity of transport had on housing 
prices to calculate the tax revenue to be re-
ceived by the operators (see Table 4). 
Table 4
Projected amount of funding transfers 




in 2019, ths rbs





We will use the estimated value of the 
bonus to a public transport operator to 
find whether these funds will be sufficient 
to modernize the transport infrastructure 
or not. At the beginning of 2019, Ekate-
rinburg Metro had to borrow funds on 
loan – 486 million roubles for 8 years – to 
buy new carriages. The costs of servicing 
the credit line are 208.2 million roubles. 
At the same time, Ekaterinburg Metro 
raised their fares by 14.2% or 4 roubles in 
order to finance the investment program 
to modernize the underground fleet. 
Thus, the Metro’s capital costs were 
covered from the fares paid by the passen-
gers. It should be noted that the ‘beneficiary 
pays’ funding was not used. The perfor-
mance bonus paid to the Metro’s operator 
would help either to reduce the interest paid 
on borrowed funds or to attract outside in-
vestment through the TIF mechanism with 
reduced rates due to the guaranteed receipt 
of funds in the form of bonus.
Our estimation of the amount of the 
bonus payment to operators of the tram 
and trolley-bus services and of the under-
ground in Ekaterinburg has shown the 
feasibility of this mechanism. We have also 
illustrated the possible effect from such 
bonus payments for cutting the transport 
operating costs. 
5. Conclusion
Efficient operation of public transport 
is impossible without state co-funding. In 
this case, the operating and investment 
costs of public transport are covered by 
the revenues gained from some taxes or 
charges. Despite the distorting influence 
of taxes, the most suitable tax is the indi-
vidual property tax. 
We conducted predictive estimation 
of the amount of tax determined by the 
accessibility of public transport. Our cal-
culations took into account the proximity 
of transport on the value of property (the 
tax base for the individual property tax). 
Following the existing theoretical and em-
pirical literature, we developed our own 
model of the individual property tax, ca-
pable of generating sufficient funding for 
public transport as a part of the revenue 
is earmarked specifically for this purpose. 
This model was tested by using the 
case of Ekaterinburg. It was demonstrated 
that the amount of financial resources that 
could be generated through this source is 
sufficient to cover the capital expenditures 
of the city’s public transport operators and 
could, therefore, contribute to further ex-
pansion and modernization of the trans-
port network. 
We have also confirmed our hypothe-
sis that it is possible to build a property 
tax model that would provide a reliable 
source of financing for public transport 
depending on the impact of the transport 
infrastructure’s proximity on the market 
value of property. 
References
1. De Viti de Marco A. First Principles of Public Finance. London: Jonathan Cape; 1936. 429 p. 
Available at: https://ia801601.us.archive.org/12/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.462768/2015.462768.
First-Principles-Of-Public-Finance.pdf 
2. Wicksell K. A New Principle of Just Taxation. In: Musgrave R.A., Peacock A.T. (eds) 
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 1958, pp. 72–118. DOI: 
10.1007/978-1-349-23426-4_6
Journal of Tax Reform. 2021;7(1):6–19
17
ISSN 2412-8872
3. Lindahl E. Just Taxation – A Positive Solution. In: Musgrave R.A., Peacock A.T. (eds) 
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 1958, pp. 168–176. DOI: 
10.1007/978-1-349-23426-4_11
4. Mazzola U. The formation of the prices of public goods. In: Musgrave R.A., Peacock A.T. 
(eds) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 1958, pp. 37–47. 
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-23426-4_4
5. Enoch M., Potter S., Ison S. A Strategic approach to financing public transportthrough 
property values. Public Money and Management, 2005;25(3):147–154. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
9302.2005.00467.x
6. Keid M.G. Rev.: Peacock, A. T. (Ed.). Income Re distribution and Social Policy: A Set of 
Studies. Pp. 296. London: Jonathan Cape, 1954. 25s. net. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. 1954;295(1):165–165. DOI: 10.1177/000271625429500142
7. Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditures by Income Class, 1961 and 1965. Tax 
Foundation, INC. Research Publication No. 9. New York, 1967. Available at: https://taxfoundation.
org/tax-burdens-and-benefits-government-expenditures-income-class-1961-and-1965/
8. Aaron H., McGuire M. Public Goods and Income Distribution. Econometrica. 
1970:38(6):907–920. DOI: 10.2307/1909699
9. Van den Branden T. (ed.) Fair and efficient pricing in transport – the role of charges and 
taxes. Birmingham: Oscar Faber; 2000. Available at: https://thepep.unece.org/sites/default/
files/2017-06/EU%20taxing%20transport.pdf
10. Enoch M.P., Nijkamp P., Potter S., Ubbels B. (eds) Unfare Solutions: local earmarked charges 
to fund public transport. London: Spon Press; 2004. 176 p. Available at: https://www.routledge.
com/Unfare-Solutions-Local-Earmarked-Charges-to-Fund-Public-Transport/Enoch-Nijkamp-
Potter-Ubbels/p/book/9780415652995
11. Atkinson A., Stiglitz E. Lectures on Public Economics Updated edition. 2nd ed. Princeton 
University Press; 2015. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/738020/lectures-on-
public-economics-updated-edition-pdf
12. Leontyeva Yu., Mayburov I. Theoretical framework for building optimal transport 
taxation system. Journal of Tax Reform. 2016;2(3):193–207. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2016.2.3.024
13. Mayburov I., Leontyeva Yu. Theoretical and methodological aspects of building 
optimal system of transport payments. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Ekonomika = 
St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies. 2017;33(3):392–414. DOI: 10.21638/11701/
spbu05.2017.303
14. Farrell S. Financing European Transport Infrastructure. London: Palgrave Macmillan; 
1999. DOI: 10.1057/9780230502291
15. Buehler R., Pucher J. Making public transport financially sustainable. Transport Policy. 
2011;18(1):126–138. DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2010.07.002
16. Austin D., Dinan T. Clearing the air: The costs and consequences of higher CAFE 
standards and increased gasoline taxes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 
2005;50(3):562–582. DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2005.05.001
17. Tanishita M., Kashima S., Hayes W.J. Impact analysis of car-related taxes on fuel 
consumption in Japan. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 2003;37(2):133–155. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46557303
18. Sandmo A. The scale and scope of environmental taxation. In: E. Albi, J. Martinez-
Vazquez (eds). The Elgar Guide to Tax Systems. Edward Elgar Publishing; 2011 Chapter 8. 
19. White P.R. Allocation of funds to public transport investment and operating support. 
Transportation. 1978;7:225–242. DOI: 10.1007/BF00184641
20. Ubbels B., Nijkamp P. Unconventional funding of urban public transport. 
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment. 2002;7(5):317–329 DOI: 10.1016/
S1361-9209(01)00027-X
21. Vigrass J.W., Smith A.K. Light rail in Britain and France: Study in contrasts, 
with some similarities. Transportation Research Record. 2005;1930(1):79–87. DOI: 
10.1177/0361198105193000110
22. Owen J.K., Bergerud C., Criss B. L. A’s $40B transportation program: Success of 
a program management information system. AACE International Transactions. 2012;2:990–1010.
23. Pucher J. Back on track: eight steps to rejuvenate transport in Canada. Alternatives 
Journal. 1998;24(1):26–34.
Journal of Tax Reform. 2021;7(1):6–19
18
ISSN 2412-8872
24. Jalon M., Sanchez de Lara M., Gelashvili V. Explanatory factors for public 
transportation financing needs in Spain. Journal of Advanced Transportation. 2019:1837628. 
DOI: 10.1155/2019/1837628
25. Dye R.F., Merriman D.F. The effects of tax increment financing on economic development. 
Journal of Urban Economics. 2000;47(2):306–328 DOI: 10.1006/juec.1999.2149
26. Man J.Y., Rosentraub M.S. Tax increment financing: Municipal adoption and 
effects on property value growth. Public Finance Review. 1998;26(6):523–547. DOI: 
10.1177/109114219802600601
27. Clark G.L., O’Connor К. The informational content of financial products and the spatial 
structure of the global finance industry. In: Cox K.R. (ed.) Spaces of globalization: reasserting the 
power of the local. New York: Guilford Press; 1997, pp. 89–114. Available at: https://ora.ox.ac.
uk/objects/uuid:b4eaf96d-6133-4fc7-ba5d-0af11bd2c994
28. Weber R. Selling city futures: The financialization of urban redevelopment policy. 
Economic Geography. 2010;86(3):251–274. DOI: 10.1111/j.1944-8287.2010.01077.x
29. Smolka M.O., Furtado F. Mobilising land value increments for urban development: 
learning from the Latin America experience. IDS Bulletin. 2002;33(3):84–89. DOI: 10.1111/j.1759-
5436.2002.tb00027.x
30. Cocconcelli L., Medda F.R. Boom and bust in the Estonian real estate market 
and the role of land tax as a buffer. Land Use Policy. 2013;30(1):392–400. DOI: 10.1016/j.
landusepol.2012.04.007
31. Bourassa S.C. Land value taxation and new housing development in Pittsburgh. Growth 
and Change. 1987;18(4):44–56. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2257.1987.tb00087.x
32. Malpezzi S. Hedonic pricing models: a selective and applied review. In: 
T. O’Sullivan, K. Gibb (eds) Housing economics and public policy. Wiley; 2002, pp. 67–89. DOI: 
10.1002/9780470690680.ch5
33. Freeman A.M. Hedonic prices, property values and measuring environmental 
benefits: A survey of the issues. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 1979;81(2):154–171. DOI: 
10.2307/3439957
34. Ridker R.G., Henning J.A. The determinants of residential property values with special 
reference to air pollution. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 1967;49(2):246–257. DOI: 
10.2307/1928231 
35. Chin T.L., Chau K.W. A critical review of literature on the hedonic price model. 
International Journal for Housing Science and Its Applications. 2003;27(2):145–165. Available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2073594
36. Leontev E.V., Mayburov I.A. Assessment of the impact of public transport 
accessibility on the value of urban residential real estate. Journal of Applied Economic Research. 
2021;20(1):62–83. DOI: 10.15826/vestnik.2021.20.1.003
Information about the authors
Evgenii V. Leontev – Postgraduate of the Department of Financial and Tax 
Management, Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia 
B.N. Yeltsin, Ekaterinburg, Russia (620002, Ekaterinburg, Mira St., 19); ORCID: 
0000-0002-7531-8078; e-mail: Pasparto@yandex.ru
Yulia V. Leontyeva – Associate Professor of the Department of Financial and Tax 
Management, Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia 
B.N. Yeltsin, Ekaterinburg, Russia (620002, Ekaterinburg, Mira St., 19); ORCID: 
0000-0003-4676-9926; e-mail: uv.leonteva@mail.ru 
For citation
Leontev E.V., Leontyeva Yu.V. Individual property tax to fund public transport. 
Journal of Tax Reform. 2021;7(1):6–19. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2021.7.1.087
Article info
Received January 10, 2021; Revised March 14, 2021; Accepted April 9, 2021
Journal of Tax Reform. 2021;7(1):6–19
19
ISSN 2412-8872
Информация об авторах 
Леонтьев Евгений Владимирович – аспирант кафедры финансового и налогового 
менеджмента Уральского федерального университета имени первого Прези-
дента России Б. Н. Ельцина, г. Екатеринбург, Россия (620002, г. Екатеринбург, 
ул. Мира, 19); ORCID: 0000-0002-7531-8078; e-mail: Pasparto@yandex.ru
Леонтьева Юлия Владимировна – доцент кафедры финансового и налогового 
менеджмента Уральского федерального университета имени первого Прези-
дента России Б.Н. Ельцина, г. Екатеринбург, Россия (620002, г. Екатеринбург, 
ул. Мира, 19); ORCID: 0000-0003-4676-9926; e-mail: uv.leonteva@mail.ru 
Для цитирования
Leontev E.V., Leontyeva Yu.V. Individual property tax to fund public transport. 
Journal of Tax Reform. 2021;7(1):6–19. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2021.7.1.087
Информация о статье
Дата поступления 10 января 2021 г.; дата поступления после рецензирования 
14 марта 2021 г.; дата принятия к печати 9 апреля 2021 г.
